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Abstract 
THE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK ACT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT 
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION 
 
The subject of this research paper is the analysis of the recent national and provincial legislation 
on traditional leadership. Within the new constitutional dispensation the legislature had to retain 
traditional leadership pursuant to Chapter 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. It was unclear how to change institutions that are based on customary law and at the same 
time, recognize them as they are. The legislative branch of government provided its answer 
through the national and provincial Acts. Precisely this answer forms part of the research paper. I 
focused the analyses on this object by purely letting the legislatives words and implications 
‘speak’.  
Traditional leadership has a prominent position within customary law. The new legislation 
defines a new position of traditional authorities and creates a legal framework by the state. The 
deeper meaning is to harmonize traditional authorities and customary law with the constitutional 
imperatives. Capacitating the traditional authorities for governmental function such as service 
delivery on local sphere is the further and practical aim. 
Traditional authorities act in the local sphere. With due regard to this condition I analyse the 
national legislation. The close look entails mostly subjects that the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act, 2003 regulates. 
Furthermore I draw out the legislative mechanisms of the national Act for the subsequent 
provincial Acts.  
The second focus pertains to the provincial legislation. Statutes in the six respective provinces 
have been adopted in 2005. Each provincial Act has to deal with certain subject matter as set out 
in the national Act. Nevertheless they differ in details, supplements, language ect. Therefore I 
draw out the main particularities of the individual Acts in order to enhance a better view on 
constitutionalizing and harmonizing the traditional communities, leaders and councils with the 
constitutional imperatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
Declaration 
 
I declare that THE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK ACT, 
2003, AND ITS SUBSEQUENT PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION – A Critical Review Of Attempts 
At Integrating Traditional Leadership Into The New Democracy In South Africa is my own work, 
that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all 
the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete reference. 
 
 
 
Alexander Kamieth       13th June 2007 
 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
 
Content 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 8 
2. The national legislation – TLGF Act, 2003 ............................................................................ 10 
2.1 Preamble ............................................................................................................................ 11 
2.2 Traditional communities and their traditional councils ..................................................... 12 
2.2.1 Recognition of traditional communities ..................................................................... 13 
2.2.2 Traditional councils – the communal forum for representation ................................. 14 
2.3 Affirmative action for gender equal representation .......................................................... 15 
2.4 Recognition and withdrawal of traditional leaders ........................................................... 16 
2.5 Cooperation with municipalities and other branches of government ................................ 17 
2.6 Dispute Resolution ............................................................................................................ 17 
2.7 Codes of conduct ............................................................................................................... 18 
3. The links of national and provincial legislation on traditional leadership .............................. 19 
3.1 The Act’s prescriptions and incentives for provincial legislation ..................................... 19 
3.2 Specific referrals to the provincial legislature ................................................................... 20 
4. The provincial legislation ........................................................................................................ 21 
4.1 KwaZulu-Natal .................................................................................................................. 22 
4.1.1 Preamble ..................................................................................................................... 22 
4.1.2 Recognition of traditional communities ..................................................................... 23 
4.1.3 Representation within the council and its extended functions ................................... 23 
4.1.4 Traditional leadership in KwaZulu-Natal .................................................................. 25 
4.1.5 Misconduct and code of conduct ................................................................................ 27 
4.1.6 Oath of affirmation ..................................................................................................... 28 
4.1.7 Subsequent regulations ............................................................................................... 28 
4.2 Mpumalanga ...................................................................................................................... 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
4.2.1 Preamble ..................................................................................................................... 29 
4.2.2 Recognition of traditional communities ..................................................................... 29 
4.2.3 Traditional councils .................................................................................................... 29 
4.2.4 Traditional leadership ................................................................................................. 31 
4.2.5 Dispute resolution ...................................................................................................... 32 
4.2.6 Misconduct and code of conduct ................................................................................ 32 
4.3 North Western Province .................................................................................................... 33 
4.3.1 Preamble ..................................................................................................................... 33 
4.3.2 Recognition and withdrawal of traditional communities ........................................... 33 
4.3.3 Traditional councils .................................................................................................... 34 
4.3.4 Traditional leadership ................................................................................................. 35 
4.3.5 Dispute resolution ...................................................................................................... 36 
4.3.6 Code of conduct ......................................................................................................... 36 
4.4 Free State ........................................................................................................................... 36 
4.4.1 Preamble ..................................................................................................................... 37 
4.4.2 Recognition of traditional communities ..................................................................... 37 
4.4.3 Traditional councils .................................................................................................... 37 
4.4.4 Traditional leadership ................................................................................................. 38 
4.4.5 Code of conduct and misconduct ............................................................................... 38 
4.5 Eastern Cape ...................................................................................................................... 39 
4.5.1 Preamble ..................................................................................................................... 39 
4.5.2 Recognition of traditional communities ..................................................................... 40 
4.5.3 Traditional councils .................................................................................................... 40 
4.5.4 Traditional leadership ................................................................................................. 41 
4.5.5 Misconduct and code of conduct ................................................................................ 41 
4.6 Limpopo ............................................................................................................................ 42 
4.6.1 Preamble ..................................................................................................................... 42 
4.6.2 Recognition of traditional communities and withdrawal thereof ............................... 42 
4.6.3 Traditional councils .................................................................................................... 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
4.6.4 Traditional leadership ................................................................................................. 44 
4.6.5 Dispute resolution ...................................................................................................... 44 
4.6.6 Code of conduct ......................................................................................................... 45 
4.6.7 Oath ............................................................................................................................ 46 
5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 46 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 
1. Introduction 
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 20031 and related provincial 
legislation2 are current developments on national and provincial levels related to traditional 
leadership.3 
 
In the light of Sec. 211 and 212 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19964 
traditional authorities were entrusted exclusively with customary law.5 The provisions do not 
foresee any other role. 
 
Recently the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa adopted an Act in terms of Sec. 212 of 
the Constitution, to provide a national framework for traditional leadership.6 About one third of 
the South African population lives within traditional communities.7 The recognition of traditional 
communities, introduction of traditional councils, identification and recognition of traditional 
leaders, organization of houses of traditional leaders and a code of conduct are the main 
components of the new legislation. Besides a unified and transparent statute in each province 
with traditional communities was established and old scattered provisions were repealed. 
Advocates of and objectors to the new legislation agree upon the significance of the Act at this 
transitional stage of South Africa. 
 
The concern expressed by Currie ‘There is little in the final Constitution to prevent the new 
political order, should it wish to do so, from subjecting customary law to the same repressive 
                                                 
1 Act No. 41 of 2003 [later referred to as the TLGF Act, 2003]. 
2 Six provinces have adopted legislation related to the TLGF Act, 2003. 
3 Traditional leadership for the purpose of this research paper is an organisational structure and is subjected to the 
traditional community as the foundation. It shall not reflect any hierarchy or value judgements. 
4 Later referred to as the Constitution. 
5 Himonga, C. and Bosch, C. (2000), p. 307 (313) 
6 TLGF Act, 2003. 
7 White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance (2003), p. 49. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
tolerance that it endured under the old’,8 certainly must be considered. On the other hand 
academic writers argue that the new legislation ‘… leaves change in the hands of 
communities…’9 My analysis of the new legislation shall reflect upon the status quo of the legal 
framework of traditional leadership in its interplay of traditional or customary law, the 
constitutional role and the constitutional dispensation. 
 
Another discussion on traditional leadership stresses the contentious relation of customary law 
and the Bill of Rights, particularly with regard to the equality clause.10 For this paper the 
legitimacy of traditional leadership as laid down in the Constitution is presupposed.11 The 
statutory legislation is thereby charged to resolve this tension. 
 
The Constitution affords space for traditional leadership to re-emerge and develop, that it can 
adequately position itself in the Post-Apartheid democracy. Considering solely the new 
legislation, academics praise the new step towards an integration of traditional leadership into the 
new democracy.12 Integration should not imply the mere fusion of governmental concepts but a 
consolidation thereof for a coherent legal system in South Africa.13 The paper will first and 
foremost analyse the new legislation, its respective role within South African constitutionalism, 
and its impact on the addressed institutions.14 One cannot reduce traditional leadership to the 
functions of executive, judiciary and legislature on a local sphere. This would be a pure western 
approach and is deemed to fail in the South African context.15 Nevertheless this paper is based on 
                                                 
8 Currie, I. (1999) Sec. 36 - 3. 
9 Bennett, T. W. and Murray, C. (2005), Sec. 26 – 66. 
10 Sec. 9 of the Constitution. 
11 Chapter 12 of the Constitution. 
12 E.g.: Bekker, J.C. and Boonzaaier, C.C. (2006), p.129: ‘The government had no option and our impression is that 
it has done a magnificent job to bring two worlds together.’ 
13 For an integration of legal and social cultures into the new democracy see Du Plessis, L. (2002), p. 367 (369). 
14 Traditional communities, traditional leaders, traditional councils. 
15 E.g. The Human Rights Commission on the judiciary: ‘…the judiciary in some instances seems to still be suffering 
from an apartheid and colonial hang-over and has a tendency to look at African cultures from a Western or European 
perspective - a perspective that generally has no proper understanding of African cultures and values. The Prince and 
Bhe judgments and the dissenting judgments of some of the judges of the Constitutional Court therein are a 
reflection of this concern.’ South African Human Rights (2006), p. 183. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
western views of constitutionalism16 and will not pretend to establish an overarching analysis, 
including the historically developed views of South African traditional leadership. It will remain 
work for others to engage into and reflect about the perspective of the traditional communities. 
This paper shall only provide the legislative analysis, a rather theoretical approach.17 The 
legislation on traditional leadership in part restates and legislates customary law.18 
 
The subsequent provincial legislation has emerged from its national ‘mother’. The Act obliges 
provincial legislation to regulate certain fields and encourages to do so in others. What is 
mandatory and what is imperative will be highlighted. Then a close look at the provincial 
legislation may provide with an insight on how the provincial government integrates the 
traditional community and its traditional leadership. Lastly the variations to induce or stipulate 
provincial legislation are acknowledged and addressed. 
 
2. The national legislation – TLGF Act, 2003 
The aim of the Act is to harmonize the institution of traditional leadership with the new 
constitutional democracy. Sachs has stated ‘We should not seek to traditionalize democratic 
institutions, nor should we set out to democratize traditional ones. The objective is not so much to 
democratize traditional institutions as to constitutionalize.’ 19 
 
                                                 
16 The supreme law, the Constitution, resembles mostly western concepts of democracy and human rights, checks 
and balances, e.g. the stressed African concept and value of ubuntu did not only loose frame but also recognition in 
the constitutional jurisprudence. For a constitutional interpretation of the traditional value of ubuntu see Mqeke, R.B. 
(1996) p. 364. See also Currie, I. (1999), Sec. 36-1 footnote 3. 
17 The subject will need substantial field research in order to establish the factual state of traditional leadership, i.e. a 
restatement of the customary law on traditional leadership under the new legislation. 
18 E.g. The candidate for the inkosi, the highest traditional leader, is identified in Mpumalanga in accordance with 
customary law right after her or his birth pursuant to Sec. 18 Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. The provision is of little 
relevance for the recognition of the inkosi and is not required by the TLGF Act, 2003. Presumably the provincial 
legislature restated the actual customary rule. It is one example how customary law is being restated and legislated. 
19 Sachs, A. (1992), p. 78. 
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Is there an antagonism to democratizing and constitutionalizing20 traditional leadership? The 
question must be answered in the negative. Chapter 12 of the Constitution provides for broad 
general recognition of traditional leadership within the new constitutional dispensation.21 
The legislature had to articulate what constitutes traditional leadership in the view of 
constitutional democracy, which encompasses inter alia human rights, the rule of law and 
accountability of the democratically elected organs. It does so by establishing new institutions22 
and mechanisms.23 The flipside of the coin and the unexplored part will remain in the realm of 
customary law. First the motivations and consideration as pronounced in the Preamble will be 
analyzed. Secondly the addressed institutions and their functions, and the new mechanism form 
part of the main scrutiny. Special attention is paid to the institution of traditional councils and 
traditional leaders.24 Lastly the specific provisions inducing provincial legislation will be 
identified and categorized. 
 
2.1 Preamble 
The opening of an Act renders relatively little legal content, but it exclaims the spirit in which the 
law has been written. Especially for uncertain terrain and contested arguments jurists allude to 
general principles and the Preamble. 25 The main aim as set out in the Preamble of TLGF Act, 
2003 is a transformative26 one within the tension of the constitutional dispensation and traditional 
                                                 
20 ‘Constitutionalize’ amounts to giving founding principles according to the current state, Oxford American 
Dictionary, under the premise of transformative constitutionalism in the South African context. 
21 The Constitutional Court has affirmed this position with the following words: ‘[The Constitution Assembly] 
cannot be constitutionally faulted for leaving the complicated, varied and ever-developing specifics of how such 
leadership should function in the wider democratic society, and how customary law should develop and be 
interpreted, to future social evolution, legislative deliberation and judicial interpretation.’ Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly, Ex Parte: In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC), para. 197. 
22 E.g. traditional councils, commission on traditional leadership disputes and claims. 
23 E.g. recognition by the premier, affirmative action for women’s representation, formal co-operation of traditional 
council and municipality, code of conduct, formal inquiries. 
24 The houses of traditional leaders is not addressed ,because this institution has specific Acts and is not the focal 
issue of the TLGF Act, 2003. 
25 See one of the first judgements of the Constitutional Court on the question of constitutionality of the death penalty, 
in STATE v MAKWANYANE AND OTHERS 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), para 155, 262, 307. 
26 ‘[T]o transform the institution in line with constitutional imperatives, […] the institution of traditional leadership 
must be transformed to be in harmony with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights…’, Preamble of the TLGF Act, 
2003. 
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integrity and legitimacy. It is first and foremost recognition of the institution. This recognition 
itself gives substance to the constitutional recognition27 and lends a higher degree of approval and 
certainty. At the same time the Act undermines the legitimacy of the traditional authorities of 
customary law, which supposedly does not require approval by the state. Hence only the 
traditional leadership that undergoes the transformation towards democratic constitutionalism28 
remains recognized and constitutional. 
 
Looking at the preamble of the TLGF Act, 2003 Act one realizes that the legislature was very 
frank and formulated its motives bluntly. Traditional leadership will be shaped in accordance 
with the Constitution.29 The mentioned transition does not only reverse the suppression and 
detriments of the Apartheid regime against traditional leadership.30 More importantly this 
transition is entrenched in the assumed ‘dictates of democracy in South Africa’.31 Furthermore, 
the TLGF Act, 2003 intends to reconcile human rights and democratic imperatives with 
customary law and practices.32 
 
One has to see how much traditionalism can be retained after this transformation. Nevertheless a 
democratic transformation should per se have an open ending, i.e. the people within traditional 
communities may equally decide upon the degree and result of the transformation. 
 
2.2 Traditional communities and their traditional councils 
Unlike the hierarchical order for traditional leadership,33 the community and their representation 
are the first subjects addressed by the TLGF Act, 2003 Act.34 Both the community as such and 
                                                 
27 Sec. 211 (1) of the Constitution. 
28 With the necessary realization of human rights and co-operative governance, see Preamble of the TLGF Act, 2003. 
29 Concepts like co-operative governance, gender equality, and accountability, exemplify this transition. 
30 This value assertion refers exclusively to the legal condition traditional leadership was retained under the 
Apartheid regime. It does not entail a general value judgment. 
31 Preamble Act 41 of 2003. The ‘dictates’ of the new democracy are not established yet, if they ever will be. Value 
judgements will render substantial content to the provisions in future. 
32 Especially gender based discrimination and democratic decision-making are main concerns. 
33 Bennett, T.W. (2004), p. 103. 
34 Chapter 2 of TLGF Act, 2003. 
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the traditional council that assists the traditional leader, are the foundation of traditional 
leadership.35 
 
2.2.1 Recognition of traditional communities 
Pursuant to Sec. 211 (1) of the Constitution traditional leadership is subject to the Constitution. 
Hence its legitimacy is measured in accordance with the Constitution and the respective 
legislation.36 Hence the legitimacy of traditional leadership and the traditional communities is not 
exclusively based on customary law but also on statutes.37 Besides the indispensable prerequisites 
of the applicable customary law, the Premier of a Province pursuant to Sec. 2 (2) (a) TLGF Act, 
2003, ‘may, … recognize a community … as a traditional community’. 
 
Two main issues arise from this provision. Firstly, the statutory legitimacy is not founded on the 
factual existence of a traditional community but on the legally unqualified38 decision of the 
Premier. Secondly, the Constitution may not indicate such legitimacy, because pursuant to Sec. 
211 (1) of the Constitution traditional leadership is acknowledged and recognized in accordance 
with customary law.39 This rather theoretical example40 may illustrate some of the tensions that 
may arise when the legislature constitutionalize traditional institutions. 
The transformative aim is set out in Sec. 2 (3) TLGF Act, 2003, towards equality. This subject 
might be one of the most contested within customary and statutory law by now:41  
                                                 
35 Having said so, it does not entail the legitimacy of traditional leadership under customary law but it reflects the 
order under the new legislation. 
36 Sec. 211 (2), 212 (1) of the Constitution. 
37 For previous dilemmas of legitimacy see “Discussion paper towards a white paper on traditional leadership and 
institutions”, p. 13: ‘Successive colonial and apartheid governments subjected traditional leaders and the institution 
of traditional leadership to systems of governance foreign to it and assigned powers and functions which in many 
instances were ‘untraditional’. This compromised and undermined traditional loyalty to the institution.’ 
38 The provincial acts do not further qualify the decision making process. At times the Premier must furnish the 
decisions with her or his reasoning. 
39 Currie, I. (1999) Sec. 36-1; Hinz, M.O. (1995), with examples from Namibia p. 2, 3.  
40 The existing communities or former ‘tribes’ maintain their status within the new legislation. See Sec. 26 (5) TLGF 
Act, 2003. 
41 See Bekker, J.C. ed. al. (2006), p. 131; Bennett, T.W. (2004) p. 121; Bennett, T.W. and Murray, C. (2005), Sec. 26 
– 66; For a case study on patrilineal succession see de Beer, F. C. (2006), p. 217 sqq. 
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‘The traditional community must transform and adapt customary law…’42 for more equality, in 
particular for the succession of the leadership position.  
 
There already at the beginning lies the greatest challenge. If customary law is determined by 
customs rather than the community guided by its leader and the Constitution, then it finds itself 
within a dilemma of giving up customary law and the inherent legitimacy or jeopardizing the 
legislative recognition with its statutory legitimacy. 
 
2.2.2 Traditional councils – the communal forum for representation 
The traditional council is a constituent element of a traditional community and must be 
established at latest three month after the recognition by the Premier.43 
 
It was said that traditional leadership per se cannot be democratic, because they do not ’… 
subject themselves to periodical elections.’44 Taking into account that representation of people is 
only one token of democracy, other means of democracy can be even more effective and 
legitimate.45 For example a referendum can be far closer to the ‘demo’s’ wishes than the 
transcended government policies. In the past traditional leaders continuously reassured their 
opinions through consultation of various councils or in public meetings.46 
 
Parliament is the democratic organ of the state, because it is elected directly by the peoples. The 
Constitutional Court commented on the democratic role: ‘'The National Assembly is elected to 
represent the people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution. It does this 
by choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues, by 
passing legislation and by scrutinising and overseeing executive action.'47 
                                                 
42 Sec. 2 (3) TLGF Act, 2003. 
43 Sec. 3 (1) TLGF Act, 2003. 
44 Sachs, A. ( 1992), p.78. 
45 For examples on traditional democracy see de Villiers, F. (1995) p. 103 sqq.; Mqeke, R.B. (1996) p. 364 (368). 
46 Bennett, T.W. (2004), p. 129; Mqeke, R.B. (1996) p. 364 (368). 
47 DOCTORS FOR LIFE INTERNATIONAL V SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND OTHERS 2006 (6) 
SA 416 (CC), para. 282. 
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A wise leader considers and, if appropriate, decides in accordance with the advice of the 
councillors.48 Hence an elected council does democratize traditional leadership. In relation to the 
prescribed quota it even introduces a substantial attempt to empower women in traditional 
communities to participate in governing the community. Besides, it also strengthens a democratic 
principle of representation of all members of a community and not only of the historically 
dominant. 
 
Regarding its functions the traditional councils emerge as a linking institution of many local 
governments and traditional communities, inter alia for service delivery, development 
programmes, catastrophe management and cooperative governance. Further functions can be 
imposed by legislation49 and by provincial or national legislation.50 In comparing the functions 
and roles of traditional councils with those of traditional leaders, one can recognize a dualism51 of 
these two traditional authorities. Thus both institutions act in checks and balances. The legislature 
created a starting point at which both institutions can define themselves and in co-operation with 
the governmental institutions develop new functions. The elevation of the traditional council 
entails a new positioning, in cases even on eye-level with the traditional leaders. Having said so, 
it becomes clearer why traditional councils receive such a prominent position within the 
legislation. 
 
2.3 Affirmative action for gender equal representation 
Sachs once argued under the premise of parallel legal spheres that the Bill of Rights applies 
throughout.52 Although this assertion is certainly a laudable constitutional, reality might teach us 
otherwise. With regard to gender equality, South African developments produced institutional 
                                                 
48 See Discussion Paper (2000), p. 14: This is also a device to stabilize the political and authoritative position within 
the traditional community. 
49 Sec. 4 (1) (l) TLGF Act, 2003. 
50 Sec. 20 (1) TLGF Act, 2003. 
51 They may also share a friendly co-existence. Although now both institutions compete for the support from the 
traditional community and furthermore from the governmental support. This premise is made under the presumption 
of neutral state support, Sec. 6 TLGF Act, 2003 
52 Sachs, A. ( 1992), p. 80: ‘Though change will not be forced on anyone in an authoritarian and confrontational way, 
every man and every woman will be entitled to enforce his or her constitutional rights if he or she so wishes.’ 
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and legislative tokens, i.e. affirmative action for gender equality is attached to regulations with 
few enforcement mechanisms.53 The political and social involvement of women in a patriarchal 
environment demands transformative commitment. This is not merely a question of ability to 
reform a community in a constitutional consistent manner, but to pursue a reform in a speedy 
process.54 
 
Pursuant to Sec. 16 (3), 17 (2) (c) TLGF Act, 2003 the legislature demands an equal gender 
representation in the houses of traditional leaders, i.e. ‘sufficient number of women’. Provincial 
legislation was to provide for implementation mechanisms. Generally speaking traditional leaders 
are in hereditary positions following the male line of the family.55 
 
2.4 Recognition and withdrawal of traditional leaders 
A procedure for the recognition and withdrawal is introduced on all levels: queen- or kingship, 
senior traditional leadership56, headwoman and headman.57 However the selection and 
nomination are competences of the traditional leadership according to customary law. Today the 
procedural governmental act would render certainty and elevates the status and role of such 
positions.58 The consequence of the recognition is twofold. Firstly, the state restates the specific 
role and integrity of the traditional leader. Secondly, the traditional leader is entitled to 
remuneration pursuant to the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act, 1998.59  
 
                                                 
53 Sec. 9 (3), (4) of the Constitution; Sec. 187 of the Constitution; Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act, 2000, No 4 of 2000 
54 Sec. 25 (4) TLGF Act requires traditional councils to change within one year. 
55 On the lowest community level the position of headwomen or headman may be filled through election. That 
applies only to few communities. Most commonly the ‘patrilineal succession’ applies to customary appointment of 
traditional leaders. For examples of exception see Bennett, T.W. (2004) p. 120 sqq. 
56 Formerly known as chieftainship, Sec. 11 Traditional Leadership and Governance Bill, 2003, transformed those 
due to the derogative historical implications, see. Discussion Paper, (2000) p. 14; see also Bennett, T.W. (2004), p. 
102. 
57 Sec. 9 to 12 TLGF Act, 2003 
58 E.g. The view of the press in BUA NEWS on 14.12.2006 ‘Its ultimate aim is to restore the dignity of the 
institution and democratise it.’ 
59 Act 20 of 1998 
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In contrast, the chieftainship was the paramount position in the traditional communities.60 
Comparing the functions of traditional leaders and traditional councils, this supremacy appears to 
diminish. 
 
2.5 Cooperation with municipalities and other branches of government 
In future traditional leadership can play a significant role in spheres of local communities.61 The 
traditional authorities may advise on or assist the implementation of governmental programmes, 
e.g. educational, social and economic empowerment programmes. Hence there is a great potential 
to seek assistance in various policies.62  
 
Furthermore if any organ of state in all three spheres of government deems it adequate to engage 
with traditional leaders and councils and imposes duties and rights, there is now a procedure to do 
so.63 
 
2.6 Dispute Resolution 
One deficiency within the houses of traditional leaders on all spheres of the state had been the 
lack of dispute resolution mechanisms.64 That causes an increase of conflicts but also a stalemate 
for the decision-making process. Before the new legislation only the leader chairing the judicial 
council on a horizontal line of competence can resolve a dispute in vertical relations. On the other 
hand it is a well-established custom that a chief must consult before taking any decision. Hence it 
provides for a flexible tool of checks and balances. 
 
Although the Act entrenches the traditional institutions into the new constitutional democracy, it 
upholds the separation from the judiciary, in other words disputes must be resolved within the 
                                                 
60 Bennett, T.W. (2004) p.103. 
61 E.g. service delivery according to Sec. 76 (b) (iii) (cc) Local Government and Municipal Systems Act, 2000; see 
also Pieterse, M. (1999), p. 179 (187). 
62 Sec. 20 (1) TLGF Act, 2003 addresses a comprehensive list of legislative fields. 
63 Sec. 20 (2) TLGF Act, 2003. 
64 Bennett, T.W. (2004), p. 115. 
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traditional communities.65 The wording and the concept within the TLGF Act, 2003 prioritize 
dispute resolution, i.e. the traditional leader decides after consulting the councillors, instead of 
litigation in curia. 
Under the TLGF Act, 2003, a commission on dispute resolution is established.66 The dispute 
resolution of the Commission can address the fields of recognitions of traditional communities, 
land demarcation and leadership succession in accordance with customary law.67 The provincial 
governmental authorities are entrusted with the implementation.68 One has to see how a national 
commission can cope with the various communities and their individual customary law. In 
addition the individual may lodge a complaint and claim, which has influence on the hierarchical 
structure of traditional community and cause unprecedented conflicts lead by individuals. 
Concluding, the commission acts as a supreme judicial organ on customary law.69 
 
2.7 Codes of conduct 
Another welcomed novelty is a code of conduct70 for traditional leaders and traditional 
councils,71 a safeguard for good governance.72 The minimum components are set out in the 
Schedule of the TLGF Act, 2003. The sanctioning system on the other hand is referred to the 
provincial legislatures.73  
 
Regarding traditional leadership, the main aims of the code are compliance with the law, the best 
interest of the community, governmental cooperation, integrity of the position, political neutrality 
                                                 
65 Sec. 21 (1) (a) TLGF Act, 2003. Very questionable is the hypothetical case where provisions of the Act and the 
customary law fundamentally clash and traditional leadership claims its recognition pursuant to Sec. 211 of the 
Constitution. 
66 Sec. 22 (1) TLGF Act, 2003. 
67 Sec. 25 (2) (a) TLGF Act, 2003. 
68 Sec. 26 (2) (b) TLGF Act, 2003. 
69 It comprises the decisive competence even over the Premier or the President. See Sec. 26 (2) TLGF Act, 2003. 
70 Sec. 27 TLGF Act, 2003. 
71 By its wording it does not address individual members of tradition councils. 
72 The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill, 2003 did not envisage such a concept, but it was 
added for the TLGF Act, 2003. 
73 Sec. 27 (3) (a) (b) TLGF Act, 2003. 
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and disclosure of gifts. The traditional council must also comply with principles of good 
governance such as transparency, efficiency, cooperation and best interest of the community. 
 
3. The links of national and provincial legislation on traditional leadership 
A brief review of the linkage of the national Act and the subsequent provincial legislation shall 
enhance a better understanding of the restatement of the existing statutory and customary 
regulation and reform. 
 
In this part the modus operandi of the national legislature in relation to its provincial counterparts 
will be examined. This perception shall purport to understand constitutionalizing traditional 
leadership within the decentralized parts of South Africa. 
 
3.1 The Act’s prescriptions and incentives for provincial legislation 
Only in six out of the nine provinces traditional leadership pertains. Traditional communities vary 
amongst others in customs, rituals and traditions.74 The TLGF Act, 2003 delegates parts of 
legislation to the provincial legislature.75 Some of the referrals are framed as a legislative 
obligation76 while other provisions are optional.77 This chapter shall identify the components of 
each category. 
 
A first category can be identified by a direct referral for mandatory provisions.78 Secondly, the 
Act provides for the minimum component of a specific provision.79 Thirdly, the legislature 
                                                 
74 E.g. the naming of the leaders not only differs but carry distinct meanings. 
75 There is no referral to traditional communities that have to implement the new legislation. 
76 E.g. the establishment of traditional councils with a prescribed function of co-operative governance and with a 
gender equality quota, Sec. 4 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003. 
77 E.g. a code of conduct and the consequences in case of transgression, Sec. 27 Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act, 2003. They also function as incentives to adapt the legislation to the specific needs of 
traditional leadership on the provincial sphere. 
78 E.g. ‘Provincial legislation must provide for …’, Sec. 16 (3) TLGF Act, 2003 
79 E.g. ‘The provincial legislation referred to in subsection (1) (b) must at least provide for ...’, Sec. 11 (2) (a) TLGF 
Act, 2003. 
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inspires provincial legislation.80 Fourthly, it addresses indirectly to provincial legislation that 
might not yet exist.81 These four modes to of legislative delegation differ in the degree of 
certainty and compulsion. 
 
3.2 Specific referrals to the provincial legislature 
Overall the TLGF Act, 2003, prescribes provincial legislation to regulate details, as opposed to 
regulate on general subjects. 
 
The legislative delegation to provincial legislation address the following subjects: 
 
?  Procedure for recognition of traditional communities, Sec. 2 (2) TLGF Act, 2003 
? Traditional councils - composition, territorial jurisdiction, equal gender representation, 
functions; Sec. 3, 4 (2) TLGF Act, 2003 
? State support of traditional councils; Sec. 6 TLGF Act, 2003 
? Withdrawal of traditional communities; Sec. 7 (2) TLGF Act, 2003 
? Procedures for recognition of traditional leaders; Sec. 11 (2) TLGF Act, 2003 
? Removal of traditional leaders; Sec. 12 (3) TLGF Act, 2003 
? Procedures for recognition of a regents; Sec. 13 (2) TLGF Act, 2003 
? Identification of a traditional leaders; Sec. 14 (2) TLGF Act, 2003 
? Appointment of deputy traditional leader by traditional leaders; 15 (2) TLGF Act, 2003 
? Mechanism for the increase of female representatives and representation of women; Sec. 
16 (3) TLGF Act, 2003 
? Code of conduct for traditional councils and traditional leaders including enforcement 
mechanism; Sec. 27 TLGF Act, 2003 
 
                                                 
80 In any event the provincial legislature has the competence in terms of concurrent legislation on traditional 
leadership pursuant to Sec. 104 (1)(b)(i) of the Constitution. E.g. ‘Provincial legislation may also provide for...’, Sec. 
11 (2) (b) TLGF Act, 2003; Difficulties though arise for the conflict of the legislations. See Currie, I. (1999) ch. 36 – 
16a, 17. 
81 E.g. Once the Premier has recognised a traditional community that traditional community must establish a 
traditional council in line with principles set out in provincial legislation, Sec. 3 (1) TLGF Act, 2003. Another 
legislative premise without referral is Sec. 3 (2) (d) TLGF Act, 2003. 
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In conclusion, the TLGF, 2003 refers subject matters to the provincial legislature through 
different degrees of delegation. The national Act does not de lege provide only for a framework 
that has to be furnished with the necessary details but it also legislates specific incentives and 
details. Hence the provincial legislature has to establish complex norms with little discretion. 
Nevertheless the provincial legislature can rely on its genuine legislative competence.82 
 
4. The provincial legislation 
All six provinces83 with traditional communities and traditional leadership have passed the 
subsequent legislation guided and inspired by the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act, 2003. 
 
The outcome of this development is the second main focus of this paper. Guided by the TLGF 
Act, 2003 the provincial legislature have to establish provisions for the recognition of traditional 
communities, appointment and removal of traditional leaders, rules and function of each 
institution and a code of conduct for the institutions.84 
 
The legislature had mainly two concepts. The first is to furnish traditional leadership with 
autonomy on the local sphere and engage with it. The second is to absorb traditional leadership 
into all spheres of government. 
 
The outlines of the provincial Acts comprise predominantly subject matter of the referrals, 
omissions and supplements to the national Act. This outline enhances the understanding on how 
traditional leadership is constitutionalized in the local and provincial sphere under the legislation. 
This reflection does not state how traditional authorities were or can be but it merely states who 
the traditional authorities should be from the perspective of the legislature. 
  
                                                 
82 Sec. 104 (1) (b) (i) of the Constitution. 
83 Free State, KwaZulu–Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West, Eastern Cape.  
84 The order of provisions is peculiar, starting with traditional councils, although the queen and king have the highest 
authority and ranking within traditional communities. 
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The legislation on the provincial level is more detailed and adapted to the prevailing traditional 
community. Nevertheless the transformation of traditional leadership will create coherence. More 
importantly the provincial legislation provides a platform for evolvement of traditional leadership 
in times of democratic constitutionalism. 
 
4.1 KwaZulu-Natal 
KwaZulu- Natal Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, 200585 is the last enacted provincial 
legislation related the Traditional Leaders and Governance Framework Act, 2003. It requires 
particular attention. The relation between national legislation and the KwaZulu-Natal has been 
contentious.86 In regard to the preceding provincial legislation KwaZulu-Natal had already a 
comprehensive statutory legal framework.87 Hence the impact of the new constitutional 
imperatives carried by the Framework Act will be analyzed. 
 
4.1.1 Preamble 
Compared to the TLFG Act which circumscribes the transformation according to ‘the dictates of 
democracy, the provincial Act pronounces a more reconciling approach towards the integration of 
traditional leadership into the democratic constitutionalism. The approach is illustrated as ‘ 
recognise, protect, transform, and provide an enabling environment for the development of 
traditional communities…’.88 Traditional authorities may emerge and provide their view on their 
very constitution. Hence the Act intends to empower traditional authorities without determining 
the prescriptive outcome. 
 
                                                 
85 Provincial Act 5 of 2005 [later referred to as KZN - TLG Act, 2005]. 
86 E.g. PREMIER OF KWAZULU-NATAL V PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996 (1) SA 
769 (CC); African National Congress & another v Minister of Local Government and Housing & others, 1998 (3) 
SA 1 (CC); see also Bua news on 14.12.2006: ‘…the KwaZulu-Natal Tradition Leadership and Governance Act, 
which has been widely considered as one of the most critical pieces of legislation to have been passed in the 
provincial parliament.’ 
87 Eleven Acts on provincial level were repealed. 
88 Preamble subsection (a) of KZ-TLG Act, 2005. 
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4.1.2 Recognition of traditional communities 
As prescribed by the TLGF Act, 2003 a traditional community must apply for recognition. The 
KZN - TLG Act, 2005 requires also information concerning the name, size, location and inkosi, 
the senior traditional leader, who has jurisdiction over the traditional community. After the 
consultation of the main stakeholders, the Premier must decide. As mentioned before, an 
individual person or a group could appeal to the Commission pursuant to Sec. 25 (2) (a) (iii) 
TLGF Act, 2003 and Sec. 49 KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
 
4.1.3 Representation within the council and its extended functions 
The new formula of a traditional council instructively reflects the integration of democratic 
elements89 and promotion of gender equal representation. 
 
40 % of the representatives must be elected in an election imbizo.90 Firstly a general assembly 
decides on the representatives. Secondly the minimum female quota of 33% of the traditional 
council ensures the transformation towards gender equality. The latter condition can immensely 
affect the first one. For example the inkosi, the senior traditional leader, appoints only men as 
council members. Than the outcome of the election imbizo must comprise 83 % of female 
members. On the other hand, if the inkosi appoints at least about 55 % women, than the imbizo 
has no predetermined outcome. Having said so, it apparently becomes crucial who appoints first. 
With due regard to customary law the traditional leader has the prerogative to appoint first.91 She 
or he92 may therefore safeguard a democratic93 election by gender equal selection. 
 
                                                 
89 It is very similar to the chairing of the council. Firstly the inkosi has the right and in case of absence an elected 
deputy chair will lead meetings, Sec. 13 (1) (2) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
90 Imbizo is a meeting of community members in accordance with custom. The Act does not define whether all 
members of the community participate. Pursuant to Sec. 6 (1) KZN - TLG Act, 2005 in conjunction with the Sec. 3 
KZN - TLG Act, 2005 all members of the community should form the constituency, unless the custom provides for a 
reasonable ground of discrimination. 
91 For higher councils the royal family together with the queen or king appoints. Presumably the traditional leader 
may appoint 60 % and she or he will have also the priority of appointing. 
92 The change of order of the gender is not an emphasis to advance political correctness, but it shall help to 
demonstrate that society, civil or traditional, will need to undergo a cultural reconstruction of the role of the woman 
and the man. The Acts on traditional leadership and this research paper purport to take part in this reconstruction. 
93 Without any gender predetermination. 
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The subsequent regulations on KZN - TLG Act, 2005 indicate a relative equal obligation to select 
and elect women, i.e. the inkosi must select at least 50 % women of the total of her or his 
appointees and the imbizo also has to appoint 50 % women of the selected candidates.94 However 
the regulation does not oblige either selecting forum to adhere to the quota, nor does it provide 
for consequences in case of a breach. 
 
In the not unlikely event where the number of female candidates is insufficient the provincial 
legislature opted for flexible solution. The inkosi must prove that a minor number of women than 
required are willing95 to act in the council.96 The Premier may lower the threshold for that 
specific council with an obligatory review every five year, 97 in other words for each established 
council98. 
 
The functions of the council in KwaZulu-Natal have been extended to internal stability policies99, 
co-operations with other communities,100 administration of justice101 and cooperation with the 
municipality.102 Within the latter function it may propose new legislation, by-laws. Here it 
becomes apparent how the traditional council as a traditional authority can define its roles and 
function on its own initiative.103 Hence the provincial legislature strengthens the position of the 
traditional council as a legislature and councillor by prescribing general functions. Moreover the 
Act provides a procedure for self-definition and development. 
 
                                                 
94 See the chart in Appendix 3 of the KwaZulu-Natal Traditional Leadership Regulations, 2006. 
95 Read in conjunction with Sec. 3 KZN - TLG Act, 2005 women shall be encouraged to participate. It is difficult to 
establish a situation where an insufficient number of women are available unless customary law requires otherwise. 
In the royal family it is not unusual that women act as councillors. 
96 Sec. 6 (5) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. If allegedly there is an insufficient number of women and there is a female 
candidate not appointed then the electing or selecting traditional institution is in breach with the provision. 
97 Sec. 6 (8) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
98 Pursuant to Sec. 3 (2) (c) (ii) TLGF Act, 2003 the tenure of a traditional council is 5 years. 
99 Sec. 8 (1) (a) (c) (m) (n) (p) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
100 Sec. 8 (1) (o) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
101 Sec. 9 KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
102 Sec. 10 KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
103 In the spirit of mutual respect, assistance and cooperation the municipality must earnestly consider the proposals 
of the traditional council. 
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Any widening of functions usually requires an increase of financial and human resources. 
Therefore the traditional council must be capacitated. The provision for staffing is an instructive 
but also an optional one.104 The governmental authorities have therefore a wide discretion which 
resources at what scale to endorse. 
Finally the provincial Act prescribes a proper procedure of the meetings, including minutes, time 
frames and financial matters.105 
 
Lastly, the traditional council is a juristic personality pursuant to Sec. 46 (a) KZN - TLG Act, 
2005. Hence it can be held responsible in a court, but may also on its own behalf resolve disputes 
in a court as a last resort.106 
 
4.1.4 Traditional leadership in KwaZulu-Natal 
The province has three hierarchical levels of leadership, the isilo107, the inkosi108 and the 
iziduna109. While the isilo has the typical representative functions, the amakosi are subject to a 
strict regime. These duties include consultation of municipalities, promotion of democratic values 
enshrined in the Constitution110 and protection of community in cases of natural disasters and 
diseases. Traditional leaders also have to work within law enforcement.111 She or he must report 
to the traditional council concerned.112 From this change one can deduce that the traditional 
leader is accountable to a certain extent to the traditional council. 
 
                                                 
104 Sec. 12 KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
105 Sec. 13, 14 KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
106 For disputes related to this Act traditional councils must first exhaust the remedies provided in Sec. 49 KZN - 
TLG Act, 2005 read in conjunction with Sec. 25 TLGF Act, 2003. 
107 Monarch. 
108 Senior traditional leaders pursuant to the TLGF Act, 2003. 
109 Headwomen and headmen pursuant to the TLGF Act, 2003. 
110 Sec. 20 (1) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
111 Sec. 20 (2) (f) sqq. KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
112 Sec. 20 (2) (a) (b) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
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Although only on second rank in the traditional hierarchy the inkosi particularly must refrain 
from various political offences113, including the ‘unconstitutional overthrow of government’. 
These clauses ensure a peaceful coexistence and should not be viewed as rules for obedience or 
subordination. 
The traditional leaders and other traditional authorities can pursue their roles and functions 
without deliberate obstruction, which is prohibited under penalty of fine and imprisonment.114 
 
The grounds and procedures of a removal115 as well as the inquiry of misconduct are very 
detailed and comprehensive. Hence the responsibilities of an inkosi are linked to a strict 
enforcement mechanism exercised by the designated provincial Member of the Executive 
Council.116 
 
Retirement has been practised by general custom.117 The inkosi may now decide to retire pursuant 
to Sec. 19 (8) (a) KZN - TLG Act, 2005.118  
 
Finally the designated Member of the Executive Council oversees the traditional leaders, may 
summon119, instruct them on their functions120 and may direct investigations related to 
misconduct.121 
 
In brief, traditional leadership in KwaZulu-Natal may re-emerge and develop under the 
supervision of the provincial Government. 
                                                 
113 Sec. 20 (3) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
114 Sec. 51 (1) (b) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. However in comparison with other penal provisions, this provision lacks 
accuracy and legal certainty that is required for the imposition of a punishment pursuant to Sec. 35 (3) (l) of the 
Constitution, in other words the principle nulla poena sine lex stricta is not fulfilled. 
115 Sec. 21 to 24 KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
116 Sec. 23 (1) (j) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
117 Bennett, T and Murray, C. (2005) Sec. 26 – 45. 
118 A retirement may also safeguard a proper and adequate accomplishment of the leadership duties. With regard to 
the complexities of modern life and community organization, these functions and roles will rather increase in the 
future. 
119 Sec. 22 KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
120 Sec. 22 (2) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
121 Sec. 23 (3) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27
 
4.1.5 Misconduct and code of conduct 
The provincial legislature included an indirect code of conduct by penalizing contempt and 
certain behaviour such as ‘disgraceful, improper or unbecoming’.122 In consequence a traditional 
leader could have to cease his position and status.123 The terms of the disciplinary measures 
appear vague and susceptible to political infiltration. 
 
In addition to the prescribed code of conduct the provincial code has a much more compressive 
application.124 The code subjects all traditional authorities to a very comprehensive list catalogue 
of disclosure of interests. Furthermore the assigned member of the Executive Council may amend 
the code of conduct and change the enforcement procedure.125 Such a power over the traditional 
authorities must be carefully used, that internal deficiencies of the traditional authorities are 
resolved. At the same time the executive governmental power of the province could invade the 
discretion and the political space that the traditional authorities need for their re-emergence and 
self-development. 
 
A breach of the code of conduct can be penalized.126 The severest penalties are suspension127 and 
the removal from the office pursuant to Sec. 21 (1) (d) KZN - TLG Act, 2005.128 Consequently 
the ode of conduct won’t turn into a dead letter and may prevent severe and detrimental mischief. 
 
                                                 
122 Sec. 23 (1) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
123 Sec. 21 (1) (f) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
124 Sec. 42 (1) KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
125 Sec. 42 (4), (5) KZN - TLG Act, 2005; So far the MEC has not made use of this competence. 
126 Removal of induna Sec. 27 (5) (e) KZN - TLG Act, 2005; fine, suspension of any traditional leader, Sec. 23 (11) 
KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
127 Sec. 24 (1) KZN - TLG Act, 2005, even with suspension of the remuneration. 
128 The offence or transgression must be severe and deliberate as a reason for removal, according to Sec. 21 (3) (4). 
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4.1.6 Oath of affirmation 
Like many constitutional organs of state,129 members of the houses of traditional leaders and 
members of the traditional council swear or affirm to uphold the Constitution as a sign of 
reassurance. The wording of the oath reflects a hierarchy of references:130 
‘A.B., swear/solemnly affirm that I will be faithful to the Republic of South Africa and the 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal and will obey, respect and uphold the Constitution and all other law 
of the Republic of South Africa, and I undertake and solemnly promise to hold my office as a 
member of (insert Provincial House of Traditional Leaders or name of applicable Local House of 
Traditional Leaders or traditional council) with honour and dignity; impartially and without bias, 
fear, or favour or influence, and to perform the role and function of my office conscientiously and 
to the best of my ability. 
(In the case of an oath: "So help me God".)’ 
 
The formal act underlines the integration of traditional leadership in the democratic state.131 Only 
few provincial Acts entail such formal procedure. But nevertheless it demonstrates the control 
and competence the state assumes over traditional authorities. The oath omits a reference to the 
traditional community and customary law. Both are the source of traditional authorities in our 
legal system.132 
 
4.1.7 Subsequent regulations 
The KwaZulu-Natal Department for Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs has 
adopted regulations on several procedures.133 It addresses inter alia elections for the traditional 
council and the female quota.  
                                                 
129 Such oath improves the awareness of the dignity, independence and impartiality that such an office entails. For 
comparisons see Sec. 48 of the Constitution for Members of Parliament; Sec. 62 (6) of the Constitution for the 
delegates of the NCOP; Sec. 87 for the President; Sec. 95 for the Ministers; Sec. 174 (8) for all judges and judicial 
officers, all of these in Schedule 2 of the Constitution. 
130 Sec. 43 KZN - TLG Act, 2005 and Schedule 2 of KZN - TLG Act, 2005. 
131 Others may opine that an oath underlines dictates of democracy and traditional leaders become servants of the 
state apparatus and may loose their customary integrity. 
132 Hinz, M.O. (2006) p. 281. 
133 KwaZulu-Natal Traditional Leadership Regulations, 2005. 
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4.2 Mpumalanga134 
4.2.1 Preamble 
The legislature alludes in brief to the necessary transformation and resurrection of customary 
traditional leadership. Noteworthy is also that the provincial Government proclaims to be the 
source of transformation. 
 
4.2.2 Recognition of traditional communities 
Further mechanisms to ensure the validity and legitimacy of a community application are 
particularities of the Act. The Premier may conduct a formal inquiry135 and a referendum136 and 
may consider the recommendation of the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders.137 Despite the 
optional nature of the procedures, the panoply of references is unique so far. Thereby the Premier 
can synthesize the will of the broader traditional community and the various stakeholders to 
ensure the credibility of the decision and avoid potential disputes. 
 
The same procedures can ensure the withdrawal of the recognition in accordance with Sec. 4 of 
Mpumalanga TLG Act, 2005. The Premier must also pay due attention to the pre-constitutional 
enforced mergers and separation of traditional communities. 
 
4.2.3 Traditional councils 
The selection by the senior traditional leader and the election in the election meeting of the 
community is not yet conclusive.138 As many wards as feasible shall be elected and appointed.139 
                                                 
134 Mpumalanga Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, Act 3 of 2005 [later referred to as Mpumalanga - TLG 
Act, 2005]. 
135 Sec. 3 (2) (c) Mpumalanga - Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
136 Sec. 3 (2) (d) Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
137 Sec. 3 (3) Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
138 The provincial Act is not more specific than the TLGF Act, 2003, but the provincial Executive may provide a 
election procedure pursuant to Sec. 4 (7) Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
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Thereby the patriarchal and hierarchical structure could be reinforced to the detriment of the 
concept of a democratic election and gender equity. Considering the obligation to aim for gender 
equal representation, women must increasingly now be appointed as head of a community. 
Otherwise the provincial Act lapses in two aspects. It would not provide for gender equal 
representation and a democratically elected council and therefore fail to achieve the general 
purpose of transforming the traditional leadership in order to harmonize it with the imperatives of 
the Constitution. 
 
Candidates can be excluded for incapacity140 and for incompatibility with other positions in 
traditional authorities and organs of state.141 
 
Members of the traditional council may be dismissed for the same reasons.142 Sec. 7 (1) (f) 
Mpumalanga TLG Act, 2005, allows an unfettered discretion143 for the Premier to remove 
members of the council. 
 
Alluding to the statutory right that the community members may permanently address the council 
and issue petitions, the traditional council will be highly democratic.144  
The traditional councils have overseeing, executive and legislative functions in the local sphere 
of government, within their jurisdiction and also inter-communal functions.145 Particularly, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
139 Sec. 4 (4) Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
140 The TLGF Act, 2003 prescribes a democratic election. Any limitation on candidates and the constituency must be 
justified. While the age limitation could be justifiable, the requirement of South African citizenship for traditional 
council candidates might not pass scrutiny of a democratic election, because the members of the council are 
mandated and legitimized by the community and not appointed by the state like other state officials. The terms of 
reference must rather be the membership of the community. Therefore the community must also be able to select 
non-citizens. The related question whether the candidates must be members of the community, another genuine 
precondition, was not addressed yet, but it could be inferred. Also a previous conviction pursuant to Sec. 7 (c) 
Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005 can bar the candidature. Without further limitation it remains a questionable 
limitation. 
141 Sec. 7 Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
142 Sec. 8 Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
143 ‘…[i]n the best interest of the traditional community...’ does not render legal certainty or even guidance because 
the Premier has to support equally all traditional authorities. 
144 Sec. 12 (2) Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005; Thereby the council is obliged to adequately respond to questions and 
petitions. 
145 See Sec. 9, 11 Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
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traditional council is entitled to receive the necessary resources granted by provincial 
legislature.146 With due regard to its panoply of functions, the traditional council could claim a 
considerable amount governmental powers. Certainly, budget decisions are politically entrenched 
into continuous negotiations. Nevertheless, the Act furnishes the traditional council with a strong 
position147 to articulate and request the necessary means for its operational and institutional 
mandates. The members might receive an allowance in future and can reimburse their 
expenditures.148 Hence councillors become financially more independent and can operate more 
independently. 
 
Finally, the territorial jurisdiction of the lowest sphere of traditional leadership is linked to the 
traditional council instead of the traditional community itself,149 which certainly underlines the 
importance of the traditional council under the new legislation. 
 
4.2.4 Traditional leadership 
The Premier recognizes queen or king or the inkosi as highest traditional leader after the royal 
family has selected the heir.150 If the heir or the inkosi is unable to act in her or his capacity an 
acting inkosi, referred to as libambela, a deputy traditional leader can be chosen and appointed in 
the same manner.151 
 
In case of doubt whether the inkosi was selected correctly and in accordance with customary law 
and although the national dispute committee on traditional leadership has jurisdiction on the 
subject matter pursuant to Sec. 25 (2) TLGF Act, 2003, the Premier is not obliged to refer the 
matter to the national dispute commission.152 
 
                                                 
146 Sec. 10 Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
147 The traditional authorities will compete or at least co-exist with the local government to a certain extend.  
148 Sec. 16 Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
149 Sec. 6 Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
150 Sec. 19 (1) Act, 2005. 
151 Sec. 23 Act, 2005. 
152 See Sec. 19 (4) Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. The Premier must refer the matter to the royal family and to the 
Provincial House of Traditional Leaders. 
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The royal family decides over a potential removal of a traditional leader given the fact of a 
transgression provided in Sec. 21 (1) Mpumalanga TLG Act, 2005.  
On the next hierarchical sphere, the inkosi appoints and removes the induna, the ‘village head’.153 
There is no third level of traditional leaders. 
 
The Act does not recall the functions of traditional leaders from the TLGF Act, 2003 nor does it 
set out any further functions. Hence the legislature in Mpumalanga retains its traditional leaders 
according to customary law and the TLGF Act, 2003. 
 
Another particularity is embedded in the grounds for removal. A traditional leader can be 
removed for a conviction with a punishment of 12 months imprisonment.154 
 
4.2.5 Dispute resolution 
Disputes are generally resolved within the traditional community, as Sec. 21 (1) (a) TLGF Act, 
2003 suggests. A further remedy as contemplated in the TLGF Act, 2003 and recalled by the 
provincial legislature155 is the claim to the national dispute commission. 
 
4.2.6 Misconduct and code of conduct 
Members of traditional councils must comply with the basics principles of good governance and 
obedience to law.156 The traditional leader must furthermore not abuse her or his powers and 
functions or commit a criminal offence. 
 
The penalties or punishments, as set out in Schedule 2 of Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005, are 
considerably severe and range from a warning, order for a rehabilitation programme, to a fine 
with a maximum of R 5000 for council members and a maximum of R 10 000 for traditional 
leaders, to suspension or removal. The disciplinary procedure renders sanctions that are 
                                                 
153 See Sec. 1 definitions Act, 2005; The position might range between a traditional leader and headman. 
154 See Sec. 22 (1) (a), 20 (1) (a), 24 (2) (a) Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
155 Sec. 6 (3) Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
156 Clause 3 of Schedule 2 Mpumalanga - TLG Act, 2005. 
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comparable to punishment for criminal conduct. It is questionable whether such severity 
surpasses the purpose of the Act and unduly limits traditional leadership as such. 
 
4.3 North Western Province157 
4.3.1 Preamble 
Here the legislature repeated the Preamble of the national Act and added an emphasis on 
collaboration of traditional authorities with all spheres of government. 
 
4.3.2 Recognition and withdrawal of traditional communities 
The recognition follows the prescribed procedure by the TLGF Act, 2003. In addition it deals 
with requests to define the area of a traditional community.158 
 
In contrast to the other provincial legislation, firstly, the Premier has 12 month to decide upon the 
application159 and, secondly, must withdraw the recognition if the traditional community no 
longer meets the initial conditions.160 Hence the recognition remains conditional and depends on 
the adherence to customary law and the leadership over this group. It is the only provincial Act 
that allows an ex post refusal of the recognition. In other words, the Act allows a withdrawal of 
the recognition by the Premier.161 In all other provinces the traditional community exclusively 
has the right to withdraw the recognition. 
 
This qualified recognition bears the advantage of a consistent reflection of the community on the 
customary law and its leadership. As opposed to this flexibility, the recognition receives a degree 
                                                 
157 North West Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, Act 2 of 2005 [later referred to as NW - TLG Act, 
2005]. 
158 Sec. 5 NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
159 The other Provinces, except the Eastern Cape, have a timeframe of three month for the Premiers considerations. 
With due regard to the right for recognition pursuant to Sec. 211 (1) of the Constitution and Sec. 2 (1) and (2) TLGF 
Act, 2003, the Premier may not unreasonably delay a recognition. It is questionable whether the provision is still 
consistent with Sec. 2 (b) (ii) TLGF Act, 2003. 
160 Sec. 4 (5) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
161 It is a de jure withdrawal pursuant to Sec. 4 (3) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
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of uncertainty and constitutional vulnerability. Sec. 5 NW TLG Act, 2005 merely states ‘ …if it 
is subsequently established…’ Thus the Act does not provide details on who decides on what 
basis for a withdrawal of statutory recognition. One can only hope that the decisive authority 
bears in mind the constitutional guaranteed recognition and the interests of the traditional 
community concerned. 
 
4.3.3 Traditional councils 
Traditional councils receive little appreciation from the North West provincial legislature. For 
example, there is no procedure in case not enough women participate in the council.162 In 
contrast, the list of ‘disqualification’, the exclusion from candidature or membership, is very 
comprehensive.163 Furthermore, the exclusion from candidacy for an office is indeterminate for 
the traditional council and for ‘holding any office’. Such provision is inconsistent with the TLGF 
Act, 2003 with respect to a democratic election, and, as a limitation, this would presumably be 
inconsistent with the Constitution, due to its legal vagueness. 
 
Looking at the functions, the provincial Act lists in part similar functions as the TLGF Act, 2003, 
itemized. Other functions are not mentioned but referred to in a general clause.164 However, the 
traditional community via the traditional council can engage, inter alia, in development 
programmes.165 For these purposes, the executive branch of the provincial government oversees 
and capacitates the traditional council.166 
 
The provisions167 on oversight by the Government over, and, the accountability of the traditional 
council, as well as the kgosi or kgosigadi, the traditional leaders are an instructive example of 
what Currie refers to as ‘the same repressive tolerance that it [customary law] endured under the 
                                                 
162 See Sec. 6 NW - TLG Act, 2005. The Sec. 3 (2) (d) TLGF Act, 2003 requires  provincial legislation on how to 
determine a lower threshold. One can only wish that at least one third of the council members are female. Otherwise, 
the provincial legislature may be accused to act negligent. 
163 Sec. 7 NW - TLG Act, 2005 includes insolvency, conviction, misconduct and mental incapacity. 
164 Sec. 9 (1) (d) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
165 Sec. 33 (3) NW - TLG Act, 2005 with regard to service delivery. 
166 Sec. 34, 35 NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
167 Sec. 9 (2) NW - TLG  Act, 2005. 
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old [political order]’.168 While other provincial Acts speak of an ‘enabling environment’, the 
North West Act incorporates traditional authorities into the governmental spheres.169 For 
example, no other provincial Act provides for an absolute right of the executive to address to the 
traditional council.170 In contrast the traditional council has no specific right to address the 
executive branch of government. Thus the legislation does not reflect mutual understanding and 
respect. 
 
4.3.4 Traditional leadership 
The identification and appointment, as well as removal, are regular, i.e. the royal family decides 
and appoints according to custom and the Premier issues or withdraws a certificate of 
recognition. The position of a kgosi, the traditional leader of a traditional community, is 
incompatible with a full-time occupation in organs of state.171 The array of functions entails 
mediation, dispute resolution and representation to and for the organs of state.172 Furthermore, the 
kgosi receives legislative protection and support.173 The kgosana, the headwoman or the 
headman, is bestowed with the function of dispute resolution.174 
 
There is a general and pragmatic commitment by the provincial organs of state to introduce 
traditional leadership into the development programmes.175 The royal family shall convene 
formally and decide or make recommendations on customary law, policies regarding traditional 
communities and inheritance.176 Unlike their equivalents in the other provinces, the royal family 
                                                 
168 Currie, I. (1999) Sec. 36 - 3. 
169 E.g. The Premier may withdraw any officer or employee who was seconded assigned for the traditional authority, 
Sec. 12 (3) NW - TLG  Act, 2005. All financial matters must be reported annually to the Premier instead to the 
traditional community, according to Sec. 30 (5) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
170 See Sec. 11 (5) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
171 Sec. 17 (1) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
172 Sec. 18 (1) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
173 ‘A kgosi/ kgosigadi shall be entitled, in the lawful execution of his/her functions, to loyalty, respect, support and 
obedience of any member of the traditional community.’ See Sec. 18 (3) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
174 Sec. 23 (d) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
175 Sec. 36 NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
176 Sec. 25 NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
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may engage into substantive matters besides the selection of traditional leaders and their 
successor. 
 
4.3.5 Dispute resolution 
The Premier must enforce a decision of the national commission for dispute resolution pursuant 
to Sec. 37 NW TLG Act, 2005 in conjunction with sec 26 TLGF Act, 2003. 
 
The province establishes a commission of inquiry that acts concurrent to the national 
Commission for Dispute Resolution.177 Its mandate comprises mainly the appointment and 
conduct of traditional leaders. Apart from these specific mandates, the traditional themselves 
leaders shall preferably resolve any disputes concerning customary law and the NW TLG Act, 
2005.178 
 
4.3.6 Code of conduct 
Pursuant to Sec. 27 NW TLG Act, 2005, traditional leaders and the traditional council members 
must adhere to the provincial code of conduct. As provided in Schedule 2 of NW TLG Act, 2005, 
both codes entail only provisions of good governance and cooperation. Suspension and removal 
pertain the only consequences in case of a breach.179 
 
4.4 Free State180 
It is comparable to the KwaZulu-Natal TLG Act, 2003, but it was legislated mutatis mutandis, in 
other words both provincial Acts comprise the same main features and regulations. 
 
                                                 
177 Sec. 38 NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
178 Sec. 18 (1) (b), 25 (d) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
179 Sec. 7 (e) 14 (1) (d), 20 (1) (d), 27 (3) NW - TLG Act, 2005. 
180 Free State Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, No. 8 of 2005 [later referred to as FS - TLG Act, 2005]. 
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4.4.1 Preamble 
The Free State Act is the shortest and most concise of its kind. The preamble spells out and 
remains at the obligation imposed by the TLGF Act, 2003. It anticipates what could be referred to 
as minimalist legislation. 
 
4.4.2 Recognition of traditional communities 
On application, the community must indicate the number, region, and name of the senior 
traditional leader, as well as the name of the community.181  
Concerning the withdrawal of the recognition and besides the application by a community, the 
Act focuses on the reversing of forced mergers or separations of traditional communities prior to 
1994.182 
 
4.4.3 Traditional councils 
The Premier determines the number of council members183 and its territorial jurisdiction.184 Here, 
first the morena or kgosi, the senior traditional leader, selects 60 %185 announces the results at the 
pitso, the assembly of the traditional community, which then may select democratically the 
remaining 40 % of council members.186 Hence the prerogative of the traditional leader prevails 
over the democratic election in a pitso. 
 
Remarkably and unlike other provincial legislation, the provincial Act distinguishes between the 
vacancies of elected and selected members. Appointments of candidates are made accordingly.187 
However no mechanism has been introduced to implement minimum female representation. 
 
                                                 
181 Sec. 3 (3) FS - TLG Act, 2005. 
182 Sec. 5 (2) FS - TLG Act, 2005. 
183 Sec. 6 FS - TLG Act, 2005. 
184 Sec. 17 (1) FS - TLG Act, 2005. 
185 Sec. 7 (2) (c) FS - TLG Act, 2005 
186 Sec. 7 (2) (d) FS - TLG Act, 2005 
187 Sec. 7 (6) (a) FS - TLG Act, 2005. 
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The functions and cooperation with municipalities correspond with the TLGF Act, 2003. The 
social peace and cohesion within and amongst communities are emphasized.188 
 
The prospects for financial and human resources provided by the provincial government appear 
to be generous, as, pursuant to Sec. 11, 12, 16 FS TLG Act, 2005, the provincial government 
must supply the traditional councils with the means to fulfil their roles and functions. The line of 
reporting and accountability of the staff remains within traditional authorities.189 Hence, 
traditional councils gain a considerable degree of financial and operational independence. 
 
4.4.4 Traditional leadership 
The leadership consists of three spheres: morena e moholo, queen or king, pertains to the highest 
sphere, followed by morena or kgosi, the senior traditional leader, and finally morena wa motse 
or kgosana, the hereditary position of headwoman or headman. Also introduces positions of 
moemedi, an acting traditional leader, during vacancies, and the motlatsi, as  substitute for the 
respective traditional leader. 
 
Besides these regular hereditary leadership positions, the community elects the ramotse, the 
elected headwoman or headman.190 With regard to the gender equality policy and the absences of 
a hereditary disposition, primarily women should pursue the position of a ramotse.  
No supplementary functions or roles have been assigned to traditional leaders. 
 
4.4.5 Code of conduct and misconduct 
This extensive part of the provincial Act deserves some attention. Only the traditional leaders and 
members of the traditional councils are subjected to the code of conduct. There are various forms 
of misbehaviour addressed under the umbrella of misconduct, such as breach of code of conduct, 
                                                 
188 Sec. 15 FS - TLG Act, 2005. 
189 Sec. 7 (2) (c), 12 FS - TLG Act, 2005; In other provinces, like the North West, the reporting line goes back to the 
executive branch of government. 
190 Sec. 21 (1) FS - TLG Act, 2005. 
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drug and alcohol addiction and negligence to discharge duties.191 According to the findings of on 
inquiry, the Premier decides within her or his discretion to impose a penalty.192 
 
If a traditional authority or its member is found guilty of a Schedule 1 offence of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977,193 or any similar convictions determined by the Premier. The convict can be 
subjected simultaneously to the statutory penalty pursuant to Sec. 29 (5) FS TLG Act, 2005.194 
The code of conduct, disclosure of interests and declaration of gifts is regulated outstandingly195 
because it enforces basic principles of good governance like transparency and cooperation. 
 
4.5 Eastern Cape196 
The Act has no preliminary definitions and explanations on the various institutions. This 
omission could cause some confusion or at least diminishes the understanding of traditional 
institutions in the Eastern Cape. 
 
4.5.1 Preamble 
According to the provincial Act the new legislation owes its existence solely to the national 
legislative endeavour. It does neither speak of the necessary transformation of traditional 
leadership nor of the re-establishment of customary institutions. 
 
                                                 
191 Sec. 28 (1) FS- TLG Act, 2005. 
192 Sec. 29 (4) FS- TLG Act, 2005; It encompasses moderate penalties and harsh punishments, e.g. the fine does not 
exceed ZAR 200 as opposed to two years of suspension of remuneration. 
193 Act 51 of 1977. 
194 Prima facie if a traditional leader has been convicted then the conviction of misconduct with a fine, pursuant to 
Sec. 25 (4) (c), (d) FS- TLG Act, 2005 appears to be rather a second punishment than a penalty due to inadequate 
behaviour while on duty. 
195 See Schedule 2 of Act, 2005. 
196 Eastern Cape Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, No. 4 of 2005 [later referred to as EC - TLG Act, 
2005]. 
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4.5.2 Recognition of traditional communities 
Similar to Mpumalanga, the procedure for the recognition of traditional communities includes 
public involvement. 
 
Prior to the recognition of a traditional community, the Premier must invite the public to 
comment on the application for recognition in the newspapers and she or he must consider the 
comments before taking a decision.197 Other traditional authorities like the local or provincial 
house of traditional leaders are not involved, but may also submit comments accordingly. The 
decision must be take within 12 month,198 which appears reasonable with regard to the extensive 
hearing process. 
 
4.5.3 Traditional councils 
When establishing a traditional council, the traditional community must elect and must adhere to 
the imperative of female representation.199 The traditional community and the traditional leader, 
presumably the inkosi, determine the number of council members to be between 9 and 30.200 The 
rule on excluding candidates is flexible and optional and refers to previous serious convictions, 
citizenship, age and membership of the traditional community.201 In regard to vacancies the Act 
distinguishes between elected and selected members when filling a vacancy.202 
 
Absence from meetings may hinder the functioning of a traditional council. Therefore the explicit 
duty of attendance requires council members to fulfil their basic functions properly.203 Meetings 
                                                 
197 Sec. 5 (2) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
198 Sec. 5 (2) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
199 Sec. 6 (2) EC - TLG Act, 2005; both selecting forums, of the traditional leader and of the election meeting, must 
ensure the required female representation. 
200 Sec. 6 (2) (a) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
201 ‘A Member of the traditional council shall be a person who-…’, Sec. 6 (3) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
202Sec. 8 (2) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
203 Sec. 8(1) (c) (d) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
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and the general forthcoming of the traditional council have also been formalized in support of 
good governance.204 
 
4.5.4 Traditional leadership 
Three hierarchical spheres constitute the traditional leadership: iKumkani as king, iNkosi or 
Morena as senior traditional leaders, iNkosana" or Morenana as headman or headwoman of a 
traditional community. The traditional leaders have general functions related to the pursuit of 
social peace, stability and economic progress of the traditional community.205 
 
4.5.5 Misconduct and code of conduct 
The code of conduct is identical to the one of the TLGF Act, 2003. It serves as a yardstick for the 
determination of misconduct.206 Within the charges the assigned traditional authority must then 
narrow down and distinguish what amounts to a breach of a code of conduct and what amounts to 
a penalized misconduct that demands a severe sanction. 
 
In case of an assumed misconduct by a traditional leader the royal family decides within its own 
discretion to pursue an inquiry.207 The chairperson as well can decide within her or his discretion 
over an assumed misconduct.208 Pursuant to Sec. 20 (4) EC TLG Act, 2005, the Premier formally 
approves the decision after she or he has considered all presented facts and arguments. 
 
The sanction can range from a fine not exceeding R 1000 to a suspension of salary for two 
years.209 Either procedure reflects some autonomy of traditional authorities from governmental 
                                                 
204 See for example the prescribed and fixed agenda, record of the minutes  and further disclosures, code of conduct, 
Sec. 9 (2), 10 EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
205 Sec. 27 (7) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
206 See Sec. 19 (1) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
207 Sec. 19 (1) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
208 Sec. 19 (1) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
209 Sec.19 (1), (4) EC - TLG Act, 2005. 
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interference. Since it is their duty to ensure the good governance and functioning of these very 
institutions, these may well lead the quasi-judicial inquiries. 
 
4.6 Limpopo210 
It entails a specific protection for a individual against expulsion from a traditional communities. 
Particularly the Act has an extra-ordinary regulation on membership in traditional community.211 
 
4.6.1 Preamble 
The spirit of the legislation turns to the necessary changes of traditional leadership, which must 
embrace unity, co-operative governance, enhancement of culture and tradition. 
 
4.6.2 Recognition of traditional communities and withdrawal thereof 
The applying community has to submit the regular information, including the names of 
traditional leaders concerned, the number of community members, and the area of residence.212 
The Premier does not only issue the recognition of the traditional community but also determines 
the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the community.213 The Premier must also consider reversing 
mergers or separations of communities prior to 1994.214 
 
                                                 
210 Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institutions Act, No. 6 o 2005 [later referred to as Limpopo - TLI Act, 
2005]. 
211 See Sec. 19 Act, 2005; community membership can be viewed similar to the status of citizenship. 
212 Sec. 3 (2) Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
213 Sec. 3 (6) Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
214 Sec. 13 (1) (b) (c) Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
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4.6.3 Traditional councils 
The provincial legislature omitted to provide for a mechanism to improve political and social 
representation and engagement of women within the traditional council. The senior leader 
convenes an election meeting.215 
 
With regard to the conceptualization by the legislature, one has to presume that the female quota 
will be applied rather as an exception than as a rule.216 
 
The Premier, the majority of a council or the traditional leader can expel members on various 
grounds.217 This competence has political connotations and entails a unique power of the 
traditional leader. These provisions do not only render the council a politically dependent 
institution unduly subordinate to traditional leaders and the provincial executive institution, but 
may also run counter to the principle of democratic elections and representation within traditional 
communities. For example, according to Sec. 4(1) (c) TLGF Act, 2003, the traditional council 
assists to identify the needs of its traditional community. Needs may result into governmental 
programmes and service delivery which can be a vital political issue in a community. Traditional 
leaders have neither by national nor provincial legislation any concurrent function, but may, by 
the de jure powers deriving from this provincial legislation over traditional councils decide upon 
such substantive matters. 
 
The provincial Act does not entrust traditional councils with further functions or rights like the 
other five provinces.218 Within the chapter on traditional leadership in the Act refer to ‘The 
traditional councils must uphold traditional African values.’219  
 
                                                 
215 Sec. 4 (3) Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. Interestingly there seems to be no constitutive meeting of the traditional 
community. 
216 Sec. 4 (6) (a) Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005.’ …must be women, unless…’ 
217 See Sec. 6 (1) (2) Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005: best interest of the community, negligence for duties, ‘disgraceful’ 
conduct. 
218 This omission approves the intended limited role of traditional council under the Limpopo Act. It shall first and 
foremost advise and council the traditional leader. 
219 Sec. 18 (4) Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
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Expenses for this mandate are ensured through several sources.220 Besides the usual funding 
through the provincial government, traditional councils may, with the consent of the Premier, 
impose levy on all taxpayers within its jurisdiction.221 This competence affords the council with 
stable financial independence but may also pose a contested political field within traditional 
authorities. 
 
4.6.4 Traditional leadership 
The Act recognizes only senior traditional leaders, headwoman and headman as selected by the 
royal family and recognized by the Premier.222 There is no provision for the recognition of the 
queen or king although both are mentioned in the provincial legislation.223 Nevertheless if the 
royal family decides not to remove a traditional leader although grounds therefore exist, the 
Premier may suspend the remuneration of such a traditional leader.224 Thereby the Premier may 
intervene in cases of an undue protective royal family in the mentioned scenario. 
 
The position between traditional leadership and positions in other organs of state are 
incompatible. Traditional leaders must promote and act in the best interest of this traditional 
community, announce new legislation and attend to further functions allocated by organs of 
state.225 
 
4.6.5 Dispute resolution 
 In addition to the national dispute resolution commission the Premier, may also resolve a dispute 
concerning the boundaries of traditional communities.226 
                                                 
220 Sec. 11, 22, (1), 24, 25 Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
221 Sec. 25 Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
222 Sec, 12 Act, 2005. 
223 E.g. Sec. 15 Act, 2005. In comparison to other provinces it might amount to a negligent omission, which 
discredits queen and kingship. 
224 See Sec. 13 (5) Act, 2005. 
225 Sec. 18 (1) Act, 2005. That constitutes a carte blanche to incorporate the traditional leaders into other organs of 
state and could conflict with the constitutional recognition of traditional leadership. 
226 Sec. 20 (1) Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
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4.6.6 Code of conduct227 
The code of conduct for members of traditional councils comprises good governance, a 
comprehensive list of interests to disclose, gifts received, subjects of confidentiality, attendance 
and protection of communal property.228 The code equals the code of conduct for councillors of 
municipalities.229 
 
The Act refers the procedure of sanctioning to the traditional council that shall ensure 
attendance.230 It is a seldom example that a competence to regulate is delegated to the traditional 
authority. The Act emphasises on creating awareness on and the display of the code of 
conduct.231 It exemplifies a remarkable enforcement mechanism besides the usual sanctioning. In 
the case of a breach the traditional council itself shall investigate and decide upon a sanction.232 
The ‘convict’ may appeal to the Premier against the decision.233 Therefore, the traditional council 
may resolve disputes internally and an appellate mechanism warrants a higher degree of 
certainty. 
 
In contrast, traditional leaders must adhere to a less strict code. Only undue behaviour and 
conviction of a violent crime pertain to misconduct. The inquiry and decision process for 
breaches constitutes also a novel mechanism. The traditional council may bring a potential 
misconduct to the Premier's attention. Then the Premier must consult all stakeholders, including 
the royal family, with due regard to the various consultations before she or he delivers a decision. 
 
                                                 
227 Sec. 23 Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
228 See Clause 1 to 10 Schedule 2 Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. One can recognize the similarity with changes mutatis 
mutandis. 
229 See Schedule 1 Local Government and Municipal Systems Act, 2000. 
230 Clause 4 (3) Schedule 2 Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
231 See Clause 11 (4) Schedule 2 Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. 
232 Clause 11 (6) Schedule 2 Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005. Sanctions are request to the Premier for removal, a fine 
without any statutory limitation and suspension from the office. 
233 Clause 11 (7) Schedule 2 Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005 
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4.6.7 Oath 
Members of the traditional council must affirm their loyalty to the community by an oath. This 
specific oath pinpoints the imposes legal reference for traditional authorities: 
 
‘OATH OF OFFICE: I, A.B., do swear to be faithful to the __ traditional community and 
do solemnly and sincerely promise at all times to promote that which will advance and to 
oppose all that may harm the traditional community; to obey, observe, uphold and 
maintain the customary laws of the traditional community and all other laws of the 
Republic of South Africa; to discharge my duties with all my strength and talents to the 
best of my knowledge and ability and true to the dictates of my conscience; to do justice 
unto all; and to devote myself to the well-being of the traditional community and its 
people. May the Almighty God by His grace guide and sustain me in keeping this oath 
with honour and dignity. So help me God.’ 234  
 
The addressed subjects reflect the legitimizing authority. The council members are responsible 
and accountable to the traditional community, the very basis of its legitimate existence. 
 
5. Conclusions 
With the acknowledgement of traditional leadership, the drafters of the constitution sent a 
laudable and candid signal to traditional communities and their leaders and councils. Traditional 
leadership is part of the constitutional framework, which requires a continuous integration of its 
surrounding traditional institutions and an adaptation of customary law in this regard. The notion 
of parallel legal systems235 is redundant, because ‘indigenous law has for over a century become 
                                                 
234 Sec. 5 (2) in conjunction with Schedule 3 of Limpopo - TLI Act, 2005, the religious implications may seem 
inappropriate and as the case may be unconstitutional. 
235 See Sachs, A. (1992),  p. 77, ' … it would be inappropriate to attempt to ’democratize’ the chieftainship. Chiefs 
and chieftainesses can work democratically and should be encouraged to do so. The institution of traditional 
leadership, however, cannot be democratic.' Also described in Vorster, L.P. (2002), p. 127, where traditional and 
democratic system would only operate aptly in separate spheres. 
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closely interlinked with and influenced by statutory law.’236 The new legislation is taking this 
development a step further. In fact it attempts to democratize traditional communities, leadership 
and councils. 
 
Within the academic spheres, the legislation at hand also attempts to conceptualize the diverse 
legal systems in South Africa.237 The outline of the national and provincial legislation on 
traditional leadership highlights the different attempts to constitutionalize and integrate 
traditional communities, leadership and concils. It is the first attempt by the state and its 
institutions since the advent of democratic government in 1994. 
 
The aim of the legislation was to bring traditional communities, leaders and councils in line with 
the democracy under the new constitutional dispensation. It mainly formalized governmental 
control over the traditional authorities. Certainly some provincial Acts create a forum for the 
traditional authorities to establish self-government and self-determination within the new 
framework. But traditional communities must respond to this process, i.e. they must give their 
answer to the integration of traditional communities in the new democracy. The provincial 
legislation is seldom encouraging or instructive to build up a new vital traditional leadership 
entrusted with traditional values, culture and community-life. 
 
Communal management such as service delivery is the major focal point in the near future. One 
main focus is the integration of women into traditional leadership. Apart from the woman quota 
in traditional councils, neither national nor the provincial legislatures have introduced 
mechanisms to enforce such gender equality policy. From a legalistic point of view, traditional 
communities, leaders and councils have gained no further autonomy and little independence. But 
social and political powers could rectify the imbalances between the old and new. 
 
The legislation can also be described as strong-arm integration enforced by the state instead of 
prompted by traditional communities. For example, the consequences of conviction are severe. 
                                                 
236 EX PARTE CHAIRPERSON OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY: IN RE CERTIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996,1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 
(CC), para 191. 
237 On the process of conceptualizing customary and constitutional law see Himonga, C. and Craig, B (2000) p. 307 
(318 sqq.) 
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Members of traditional councils may be expelled or traditional leaders be discharged from their 
positions as a result of these. 
 
The provincial codes of conduct the provinces criminalize certain acts, thereby establishing a 
very strict regime. Investigations and proceedings are of an administrative nature. Even if 
misconduct is dealt within the community, one can concede a judicial settlement of misconduct 
would be more adequate in the light of such harsh consequences. In appropriate circumstances, 
the executive is afforded with powers to inquire and decide. That position is in conflict with its 
role as a partner and its oversight function. 
 
Certainly the new legislation has not addressed all potential conflict zones of traditional 
leadership.238 But it can certainly give guidance for further supplementary legislation, also from 
the local sphere, and the practise. 
 
The implementation of the Acts can only succeed within the sphere of inter-governmental 
relation and with a sincere engagement with traditional communities, leaders and councils.239 The 
main Act provides an incomplete answer of what constitutes traditional leadership within the new 
constitutional dispensation, because the addressed institutions are local and regional ones. 
Whether legislation has a ‘one way’ effect only, from the constitutional democracy impacting 
upon traditional communities, leaders and councils, or whether the latter now form an integral 
part of the constitutional democracy in South Africa, remains a question for the future. 
 
In any event the restatement and constitutionalization of the respective positions of traditional, 
communities, leadership and councils, is remarkable achievement in itself.  
 
Concerning gender equality in the traditional leadership little has been done through the legal 
framework. Only some integrated representation of women on traditional councils has been 
provided for, in addition to allowing, for example, ‘queenship’ or ‘headwomanship’. Traditional 
                                                 
238 Bennett, T.W. and Murray, C. (2005), ch. 26-1 sqq. 
239 See Olivier, N. (2006), p. 86. 
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communities and their authorities themselves must implement these new policies to allow women 
in leadership position.240 
 
The Acts vary considerably for certain respect, but do not address customary law. The divergence 
is not necessarily based on distinct traditional leaderships positions or the underlying customary 
law. The provincial legislatures rather spelt out what they wanted traditional leadership to be. 
 
Looking at the listed functions of the traditional leader and their councils, one can see that these 
surpass the mere preservation and development of customary law. The new roles are not yet 
absolutely predetermined or defined as yet. Traditional communities exist next to modern western 
society in a rapidly changing constitutional state. The new legal system allows traditional 
leadership based on customary law to re-emerge properly and integrate itself. 
 
The provincial legislation has brought about several improvements and details for traditional 
communities and their leadership. The codes of conduct are comprehensive and contain 
enforcement mechanisms. However, the main challenges with regard to the implementation of 
gender equality have not been attended to. The provincial Acts mostly repeat the national Act 
without giving further substance in this regard. For example, no mechanism encouraging women 
to pursue traditional leadership and councillorship positions, has been created by any of the 
provincial legislature. 
 
Looking at traditional councils and their traditional leaders, generally their competences, 
functions and dispute resolution received some clear content through the provincial legislation. 
Thus one can assume the provincial Acts are going to support the successful modernization and 
integration of these traditional authorities within the democratic constitutionalism. 
                                                 
240 The pursuit of gender equality through the courts would not suffice because they could only reconcile what has 
been brought forward to them. In order to reconcile the customary law with the new constitutional dispensation, 
continuous reforms and interpretations are necessary. A court decision by its nature cannot substitute such reforms. 
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